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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH HODGES, Respcmdent, 
V·S. 
I. A. SMOOT and C. M. CROFT, 
Appellants. 
Respondent's Brief. 
NEWEL G. DAINES, 
Attorney for Respondent. 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEP·H HODGES, Respondent, 
vs. 
I. A. SMOOT and C. M. CROFT, 
A pp.ellants.. 
STATEMENT OF CASE. 
There are three causes of action in this .case. The 
first based on a promissory note for $1300.00, and the sec-
ond on one for $529.20, and the third is stated in two 
counts. The first count of the third cause of action states 
a cause of action on a note for $3,931.30, which it is alleg-
ed is a renewal of the note set out in the second .count of 
the third cause of action in the sum of $2835.00. 
As a defense to the first cause of action, the defend-
ants plead the statutes of limitations, second that the 
said note was given for the use and benefit of the Gordon 
Creek Coal Company; and, third, that said plaintiff agreed 
to surrender said note for stock in the Gordon Creek Coal 
Company. 
A.s an affirmative defense to the second cause of ac-
tion, the defendants plead that the note in question was 
given as an accommodation to the plaintiff. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As a defense to the first count in the third cause of 
action, the defendants attempt to plead that the note in 
question was delivered conditionally, said condition being 
that it was not to become effective unless the signature 
of one W. W. Seegmiller was obtained on said note with 
the two defendants. Plaintiff mai~ntains that this is the 
only question in the whole case raised by the pleadings 
that should have been submitted to the jury. 
As a defense to the second count in the third cause 
of action, the defendants allege that said note was barred 
by the statute of limitations, and that the same was paid 
and delivered toW. W. Seegmiller for ·ca~ncellation. The 
case was tried to a jury, and the judge indicated that he 
was going to submit the case to the jury on a special ver-
dict. Plaintiff requested that the jury be required to 
bring in a general verdict on the three .causes of action, 
but the Court denied the request and submitted the special 
interrogatories (Tr. 117, 171, 181) .. 
At the close of the evidence on the first day of the 
trial the plaintiff made a motion for a directed verdict in 
all three causes of action; whereupon the defendants re-
9uested the court to direct a verdict for the defendants on 
the third cause of action. The Court then indicated that 
it was his intention, when the court again convened, to 
deny both motions and to submit the case to the jury on 
special interrrogatories (Tr. 171). When the court did con-
vene, some evidence was submitted, but the case wrs sub-
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mitted to the jury on special interrogatories. Counsel for 
plaintiff requested a general verdict (Tr. 181, 182). 
The jury returned the special verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff, which said findings or special verdict was filed 
May 9, 1939 (Tr. 40). On May 23, 1939, defendants' at-
tor.ney filed a notice of motion for new trial, and on May 
25, 1939, filed a motion for a new trial (Tr. 41-43). Coun-
sel for plaintiff in open court moved to strike the motion 
and notice of motion on the ground that it was not filed in 
time (Minute Entry Tr. p. 214). The Court however, 
granted counsel for defendants time to make a showing, 
which ·showing consisted of an affidavit filed by the at-
torney for the defendants that he did not know that the 
time for filing a motion for a new trial had started to run 
from the time the special verdict was filed (Tr. 50, 51) . 
The Court permitted the motion to be filed and heard the 
same, but denied it, and ordered judgment and findings to 
be entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the de-
fendants. (Minute Entry Tr. 214). The findings and judg-
ment were dated June 8, 1940, and notice of judgment 
June 10, 1940, whereupon after some extension of time, 
notice of appeal was served and the bill of exception 
settled. However, no abstract of the record was ever pre-
pared or served on counsel, and no assignments of error 
were ever made, ex:cept what is argued in counsel's brief. 
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REPLY TO ARGUMENT. 
In counsel's brief he ·states, without having made an 
assignment of errors, that he relies on three errors comit. 
ted by the Court, to-wit: F'ir.st: That the .court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury because of the fact that 
both plaintiff and defendants made a motion for a direct-
ed verdict on the third cause of action; Second: the insuf-
ficiency of the evidence to justify the findings of the jury; 
and, Third: prejudice of the jury. 
We assume that this court will consider only the 
grounds stated or assigned as error in the appellants' 
brief. Therefore, we will discuss .no other matters in our 
brief, except to reply to arguments of counsel. 
We maintain that the court did not commit error in 
submitting the case to the jury on the third ·cause of ac-
tion, for the following reasons. 
First: That at the time the motions were made for 
a directed verdict a•nd denied, the court indicated his in-
tention to submit the case to the jury on special findings, 
and asked both parties to 'SUbmit instructions if they de-
sired. To this statement of the court the defendants made 
no objection and never indicated that the court should 
take the case away from the jury except to grant or deny 
their motion and took no exception thereto, and thereby 
waived any objections they might have had and said mat-
ter cannot be considered for the first time in the Supreme 
Court. 
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Second: The rule which counsel seeks to invoke in this 
matter is based on the theory that by both parties making 
a motion for a directed verdict, they each waive a jury 
and thereby consent that the case may be decided by the 
trial judge. But where instructions to the jury are sub-
mitted, the Courts hold that such rule is not to be invoked, 
even in those jurisdictions where the rule applies, and our 
Supreme Court has held such to be the law. 
Third: That the matter of submitting special findings 
to the jury is within the discretion of the trial judge, and 
unless such discretion is abused error cannot be predicat-
ed thereon.. 
1. Obie.otion Not Made and Hence Waived.- Title 
104, Chapter 39, Section .1 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
defines an exception and states what exceptions are saved 
by the statutes, and states: "The exception must be taken 
at the time the decision is made, except as provided in the 
next section." Title 104, Chapter 39, Section 2, enumerates 
the exceptions which are saved by the statutes, and the 
improper submission of a case to the jury is not therein 
enumerated, hence the objection would have to be taken 
at the time, or else it is waived. In discussing this quest-
ion the Court in the case of Felice vs. Biscardi, 246 Pac. 
535, 67 Utah 171, said: 
"The defendant, however, ·contends that the 
court erred in submitting the issue of payment to 
a jury. There are two answers to the contention, 
either one of which is conclusive against the de-
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fendant: (1) the record does not disclose any ob-
jection or exception to the court's action in calling 
a jury and in ·submitting the issue to it; and (2) 
even if there had been such an objection and ex-
ception the matter of calling a jury as advisory to 
the court was clearly within the sound discretion 
of the ·court, and hence this assignment must fail." 
This question cannot be considered when raised for 
the first time in this Court. Many cases could be cited, 
but we think the following should be sufficient: 
Geros vs. Harries, 236 Pac. 220, 65 U tab 227; 
Van Cott vs. Wall, 178 Pac. 42, 53 Utah 272. 
WHERE INSTRUCTIONS ARE REQUESTED 
CASE IS TO BE SUBMITTED TO JURY. On the second 
point ·counsel has answered the question himself in his 
brief, as he quotes Christensen v.s. Utah Rapid Transit 
Company, 83 Utah 231, 27 Pac. (2nd) 468, and Wood vs. 
Kinter, 86 Utah, 279, 43 Pa·c. (2nd) 192, wherein this 
court holds that if instructions to the jury are requested 
that the rule is waived and cannot be invoked. See also, 
64 C. J. 440, and in particular notes 85 and 86. 
3. MATTER WITHIN DISCRETION OF TRIAL 
JUDGE. We submit that where there is a question of 
fact to be decided and a jury has been requested aJnd in-
structed, the trial judge may always submit the question 
of fact to the jury without committing error. (See 64 C. 
J. 440 and cases there cited.) An error might be commit-
ted by the trial judge in taking a case away from the jury 
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2. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE. We 
now turn to the purported a·ssignment No. 2, wherein i.t is 
claimed that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
special verdict. In this connection we admit that counsel 
has correctly stated the law and we adopt his citations. 
In his quotation from Jackson vs. James, 97 Utah 41, 
89 Pac. (2nd) 235, we find: 
"This being an action fliaw and the jury having 
found the facts, we ·cannot disturb the verdict if 
there is evidence from which a jury as reasonable 
men ·could, so have found." 
On page 21 of counsel's brief in discussing the answer 
to special interrogatory No. 3, we submit that counsel has 
stated himself right out of court wherein he says: 
"Here one witness testified that the signatures 
were absolute, and two witnesses testified that they 
were conditional." 
What more ·can be required? The jury had a right to 
believe the one witness as against two if they choose to 
do so. 
The court gave the jury the following stock instruc-
tions, which are given in practically every jury case and 
conceded to be the law, to-wit: (Tr. 36) 
By the preponderance of the evidence is meant 
the greater weight of the evidence, that which i1s 
the more convincing as to its truth. It is not nec-
-essarily determined my the 'number of witnesses 
for or against a proposition, although, all other 
things being equal, it may be so determined. 
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You are the exclusive judges of all questions of 
fact, and of the credibility of witnesses. In judg-
ing of their credibility you have the right to take 
into consideration their deportment on the witness 
stand, their interest, if aflly is shown, in the result 
of the suit, the reasonableness of their statements, 
their apparent frankness or ·candor, or the want 
of it; their opportunities to know and understand, 
and their capacity to remember. You have the 
right to consider any fact or circumstance in evi-
dence which in your judgment affects the crdibil-
ity of any witness. If you believe from the evi-
dence that any witness who has testified in this 
case has knowingly and wilfully testified falsely 
to any material fact in this case, you may disre-
gard the whole testimony of ·such witness, unless 
the witness is corroborated by other .credible evi-
dence or you may give such weight to the evidence 
of such witness on other points as you may think 
it entitled to; the jury are the e}rclusive judges of 
the weight of the testimony. 
We quote from the examination of 'Mr. Hodges by Mr. 
Bird: (Tr. 108) 
Q.: "Now, Mr. Hodges, when the defendants signed 
Exhibit "D", which is a note for thirty nine hundred dol-
lars, did they state that they were signing upon condition, 
or conditioned upon your receiving the signature of Mr. 
Seegmiller?"' 
A.: They didn't. 
Q.: Did they say they were obliged for the entire 
amount? 
A.: Yes,, sir. 
**** Q.: Didn't they say that they would sign only if you 
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would get Seegmiller's signature? (Tr. 110.) 
A.: No, they didn't. They told me that Seegmiller 
would not sign it. They were sure that he would not sign. 
We submit that is very substantial evidence and en-
tirely sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury. We do 
not know what more would he necessary. 
SPECIAL INTERROGATORY No. 2 and 4. In 
testifying as to the reason for the note for $529.20 Mr. 
Hodges ·said: (Tr. 92). 
"Q.: And is that the note sued upon in the second 
cause of action? (Meaning Exhibit "B", note for $529.20.) 
A.: Yes, sir. 
Q.: Now, does that note have any relation to this five 
hundred dollar endorsement here? (Indicating $500.00 
endorsement on $1300.00 ~note.) 
A.: Yes., sir. 
Q.: What is it? 
A.: That is a renewal of the five hundred dollar note 
that is endorsed on that note." (The $1300.00 note.) 
Mr. Croft testified: (Tr. 140) 
"Q.: What was the ·conversation at the time exhibit 
"B" was signed on October 27th, 1927? (1937) 
A.: If I remember right the $500.00 note was a short 
time note. ·He brought this one down, if we would sign 
this note, itncluding the interest, so as to bring it, that 
other note up to date so that it could be used." .{Meaning 
the $1300 note.) 
Mr. Smoot testified as follows: (Tr. 155, 156) 
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"Q.: Now, you notice this five hundred dollar endorse-
ment on the back of the note 1 
A.: Yes. sir. 
Q.: You didn't pay the five hudred dollars in cash? 
A.: No, sir. 
Q.: Was that the note that has been introduced in evi-
dence here as plaintiff's exhibit "B"? 
A.: I take it, that one here, taken up as a renewal, 
was to apply on that other note. I assume that." (Mean-
ing the $1300.00 note.) 
All three of these witnes·ses testified that this note 
was signed to be used as an endorsement of interest on 
the $1300.00 note. That is sufficient to justify the jury in 
finding that the note was given for a valuable considera-
tion as all three parties te'Stified that it was. We might 
here observe that if the defendants do not owe this note 
then they owe five hundred dollars more interest on the 
$1300.00 note. However, we do not need to rely on that to 
toll the statutes of limitations on the $1300.00 note. 
In paragraph four of the first cause of action (Tr. 2) 
we allege that an action was started on this note on Octo-
ber 15, 1935; that is, two days before it was outlawed, and 
that said action remained pending until the 6th day of 
December, 1939.. Counsel 'Stipulated in open court that 
these facts were true, (Tr. 91-92) and the court found said 
facts to be true. (Findings No. 4, Tr. 54.) 
The statutes of limitations did not run while the other 
action was pending and we had one year after December 
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6, 1939~ in which to file an action on said note. See Title 
104, Chapter 2, Section 41 of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, and the following cases: 
Luke vs. Bennion, 36 Utah 61, 106 Pac .. 712; 
Salisbury vs. Poulson, 51 Utah 552, 172 Pac. 315; 
Platz vs. International Smelting Company, 61 Utah 
342, 213 Pac. 187. 
We maintain, that this is an absolute answer to counsel's 
argument regarding the statute of limitation on the first 
cause of action. However, Mr. Hodges testified (Tr. 91) 
defendants sent him a car of coal to be applied on the 
several obligations and he applied $11.05 on this particular 
note. The defendants testified (Tr. 148) that they sent 
Mr. Hodges two cars of coal, that he paid them for one, 
but they gave him the other. The jury., however, found 
that it was a payment on the note and there is ample evi-
dence to justify ·such a finding. 
SPECIAIJ INTERROGATORY No.6. This question 
asks whether or not the defendants acquiesed in the en-
dorsement of $11.05 on the $1300.00 note. The fact that 
another action was pending prevents the $1300.00 note 
from being outlawed, so it seems to us that this question 
becomes immaterial. However, all testified that the de-
fendants sent Mr. Hodges a car of coal. The plaintiff 
testified that it was to apply on the defendants obligations 
and he so applied it. The defendants said they gave it to 
the plaintiff. The jury believed the plaintiff in that re-
spect which they had a perfect right to do and as any 
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reasonable person would do. Therefore, we see no neces-
sity of arguing this point any further. As evidence that 
the jury was very conscientious in their deliberation be-
fore they would make a finding on this point, they came 
back into the court and had the evidence read to them. 
(Tr. 185.) 
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 5 , 7 and 8. As 
the jury has already found that the $3931.50 note was not 
'Conditionally delivered, but that the defendants ·were 
bound thereby, the answers to question 5, 7 and 8 become 
immaterial as this is the same obligation represented by 
the $3931.30 note. ·These questions all have to do with 
the $2.00 which it was testified the defendant Smoot gave 
the son of the plaintiff. The evidence of Joseph D. Hod-
ges, son of the plaintiff, on this point is as follows: (Tr. 
page 116) 
"A.: I handed Mr. Smoot the order, upon which, after 
reading, he said that he was sorry that he could not do 
more for me at the time because of pressing obligations 
which he had, but because I was in Salt Lake, and I also 
needed a little money, that he would let me have two dol-
lars on the account of what he owed my father. 
Q.: Did he pay it to you? 
A.: Yes, sir, he gave me the two dollars. 
Q.: Did you subsequently report that to your father? 
A.: Yes, sir, when I returned from Salt Lake." 
Mr. Smoot (Tr. 168) admitted the conversation with 
the plaintiff's son, and the payment of the $2.00, but does-
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n't admit that it was to apply on any obligation. Certain-
ly the jury was amply justified in believing the son's testi-
mony, and the plaintiff had a right to apply the $2.00 
payment on any obligation that was owing from defend-
ants to plaintiff at that time. 
We might here also observe that even if the jury had 
found that the $3931.30 note was conditionally signed, 
still it would operate as a written acknowledgement of 
the $2835.00 note and toll the statute of limitations on that 
.note. So the defendants are bound regardless of how it 
is considered. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
In dis·cussing this poi~nt our contention is that it was error 
for the court to even consider this motion for a new trial 
as it was not :filed within the time required by law as pre-
viously stated. The only .excuse that the appellants give 
for their failure to comply with the law is that cousel 
didn't know it. That is ·no excuse for the delay. However, 
the trial court was clearly right, after entertaining the 
motion, in overruling it. Here again we have no quarrel 
with counsel's statement of the law. The verdict should 
not be set aside unless there is a total lack of evidence to 
sustain the verdict. We have previously shown that there 
is ample evidence to sustain every question which was put 
to the jury and the jury was justified in finding as they 
did. They merely followed the instructions of the Court 
wherein they were intrusted that they were the sole 
judges of the facts, and that if they believed any wit-
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ness had testified falsely they were at liberty to disregard 
the whole of the testimony of that witness. Apparently 
the jury believed the testimony of the plaintiff and his 
witness rather than the testin1ony of the defendants and 
this it had a perfect right to do according to the instruc-
tions given. Therefore, we will not enter into an extended 
argument on this question as we feel that it has already 
been covered. 
As shown by the authorities cited by counsel, 
one of the main causes for granting a new trial is a mis-
carriage of justice. We ask this court to examine the 
evidence and see if there is any possible miscarriage of 
justice in this case. The defendants admit signing of all 
the notes sued upon. They admit having received the 
money. They say, however, that the money was used for 
the be:1efit of the Gordon Creek Coal Company. That is 
probably true, and the company probably should pay the 
money back if it had any. ~However, the plaintiff cannot 
look to that company for his money. He made the loan in 
good faith to the defendants, and by doing so, impaired 
his own credit. The defendants still claim to have faith 
in the coal mine which they developed and claim to own, 
and will probably make plenty of·money out of it, if and 
when it comes into production. We think these defend-
ants do not want to see the plaintiff lose his money, and 
that they would pay it back if they could ·conveniently do 
so. However, the fact that they made a poor investment 
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should not deny thi·s plaintiff of his right to a judgment 
against them. 
All of the defenses of the defendants are highly 
technical and seek to take every advantage which the law 
gives them. They haven't been cheated and they·haven't 
been beaten in anyway. It would have been a miscarriage 
of justice for the jury to decide any other way than the 
way they did decide. The facts <Shown by the evidence 
and the law quoted by counsel for appellant and herein 
quoted show very clearly that the verdict of the jury and 
the judgment of the trial court should be upheld in every 
respect. 
Respectfully submitted., 
NEWEL G. DAINES, 
Attorney foq- Respornilernt. 
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